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BLENDING REFORM OF TORT LIABILITY AND
HEALTH INSURANCE: A NECESSARY MIX
Jeffrey O'Connellt
I
THE THEsIs

The thesis of this Article is that making more health insurance
benefits available to more people, far from lessening injury victims'
proclivity to sue in tort (as conventional wisdom argues), will increase
such suits. Thus, it is necessary to accompany any increases in health
care coverage with the type of tort reform proposed herein.1 This
reform would allow parties to opt out of the cumbersome and expensive tort claim process with its compensation of noneconomic losses by
substituting quicker and surer compensation of any unmet economic
losses.
A.

Current Views

This Article starts from the premise that tort liability insurance
has long been seen as perversely ineffective and inefficient in providing compensation for illness and injury. In the words of Harvard Law
School Professor Paul Weiler, a leading authority on tort law (speaking of medical malpractice claims but making an argument applicable
to all types of tort claims for personal injury):
Viewed as a form of insurance, the malpractice regime has major
flaws.... [T] ort benefits are doled out in a rather arbitrary manner
to some-but not most-deserving victims, and also to those...
who are not even "deserving" under tort law's fault-based frame of
reference. Even worse, to make payment to the relative handful...
who do surmount the natural and legal barriers to demonstrating
legal entitlement to damages, the medical malpractice system must
spend an inordinate amount of both time ...and money... litigatt The Samuel H. McCoy II and Class of 1948 Professor of Law, University of Virginia;
K-B., 1951, Dartmouth College;J.D., 1954, Harvard University.
The author would also like to thank Phillip A. Bock, B.A., Augustana College, 1989;
M.A. University of Illinois, 1991; J.D., University of Virginia, 1994, Stewart Petoe, B.A. College of William & Mary, 1992;J.D. University of Virginia, 1995, and Christopher Robinette,
BA, College of William & Mary, 1993; Class of 1996, University of Virginia Law School for
their research assistance. The author is also grateful for the help of Devin O'Connell, B.A.,
University of Iowa, 1984.
1 Even with the sweeping 1994 Republican electoral victory, some health insurance
reform-expanding coverage will in all likelihood be pursued, whether by public or private
avenues.
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ing whether the doctor was at fault so that the victim can be
2
compensated.
On the other hand, it has long been widely assumed, even by sophisticated observers, that America's excessive reliance on inefficient
tort liability stems from our comparatively inadequate forms of other
private and social insurance. For example, an editorial from such a
sophisticated source as The Economist (speaking of product liability but
making an argument applicable to all types of tort claims for personal
injury) states:
The debate over product liability in America has been passionate, polarised and informed mainly by prejudice.... On one side,
businessmen and zealous law-reformers bellow that... litigiousness
and jackpot juries . . .are driving America's economy into the
ground .... On the other, trial lawyers and consumer advocates
bellow back that, without such huge awards, firms would sack every
safety inspector in sight.
Neither side in this noisy debate is appealing to reason; and
both are wrong....

. . [S]ome
1
reformers .. .argue that "pain and suffering"
awards should be abolished, and that onlyjudgments based on "economic loss" ... should be allowed....
...[Changes in pain-and-suffering awards] and limits on punitive damages would make the system more predictable, but it would
not reduce liability litigation in America to European levels. This is
not because all Americans are sue-happy (though some are) but because, for millions of Americans, the legal system is also their primary health insurer. So the best way to slash the number of lawsuits
would be to fix America's dreadful health-care system-another ex3
ample where more reason, and less passion, is sorely needed.
B.

What the Data Show

"Fixing" (i.e., expanding) America's health care system, far from
slashing the number of lawsuits, will likely increase, not lessen them.
4
In this connection, note Tables A and B below.

2 Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REv. 908, 915
(1993).
3
Sue the Rascals, ECONOMIST,Feb. 13, 1993, at 18-19.
4 These tables are adapted from tables 1 and 3 in Part II, infra. For an important
adjustment concerning such tables, see note 1, Appendix C. For an estimate that "liability
payments represent[ed] ...7 percent of total annual compensation dollars [in 1988]," see
DEBORAH R HENSLER ET AL, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVILJUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR AcciDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 175 (1991).
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TABLE A
BENEFITS PAID FOR INJURY AND ILLNESS BY
PRINCIPAL LOSS-SHIFTING SYSTEMS,

1982-1990.

(DOLLARS IN BILLIONS)

Tort Liability
Workers' Compensation
Private Loss Insurance
Sick Leave
Social Insurance
Public Assistance
Veterans
Public Health
Private Health

1982
$23.1
17.8
102.9
10.6
110.8
39.1
19.2
13.2
10.9

1984
29.5
21.4
125.3
12.9
122.1
44.9
20.2
13.0
11.2

1988
53.0
33.5
192.9
17.0
164.1
65.5
22.6
18.0
24.3

1990
65.3
41.5
237.5
19.3
196.0
85.1
24.3
20.3
30.6

$347.5

$400.5

$590.9

$719.9

Table A shows the recent expansion of all loss-shifting systems.
But, as suggested, Tables A and B indicate that instead of lowering
the cost of tort liability, expansion of private and social insurance
seems to inflate it. At the least, it certainly does not seem to lessen it.
TABLE B
RELATIVE PERCENTAGES OF
BENEFITS PAID FOR INJURY AND ILLNESS

BY

PRINCIPAL LOSS-SHIFTING SYSTEMS

Tort Liability
Workers' Compensation
Private Loss Insurance
Sick Leave
Social Insurance
Public Assistance
Veterans
Other Public Health
Private Health

1982
6.7%
5.1%
29.6%
3.1%
31.9%
11.2%
5.5%
3.8%
3.1%

1984
7.4%
5.3%
31.2%
3.2%
30.6%
11.2%
5.0%
3.2%
2.8%

1988
9.0%
5.7%
32.7%
2.9%
27.8%
11.1%
3.8%
3.0%
4.1%

1990
9.1%
5.8%
33.0%
2.7%
27.2%
11.8%
3.4%
2.8%
4.3%

100.0%

99.9%

100.0%

100.0%

Table B shows significant growth in the benefits paid for tort liability
relative to the total benefits paid from all expanding private and social
insurance systems during three years in the 1980s-1982, 1984, and
1988-and a further increase in 1990. In fact, as social and private
insurance grow, tort liability insurance not only grows along with it,
but also seems, if anything, to grow faster. In other words, tort liability
seems to continue to take increasingly large proportions of the

1306

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1303

universe of funds-itself increasing-available for compensating
illness and injury. Even more discouraging, apparently some of the
funds distributed by other loss-shifting systems, such as public and
private health and disability insurance benefits, both subsidize and are
subsidized by tort litigation.
C.

Subsidizing Tort Litigation

Subsidization of tort liability claims by other forms of insurance
occurs because claimants, buttressed by an increasingly active personal injury bar, 5 are provided with medical and other forms of relief
6
which enable them to pursue their tort claims more aggressively.
Thus, benefits paid by other loss-shifting systems insulate the claimant
from financial need during the normally prolonged tort claims process. That insulation is reinforced by the claimant counsel's contingent fee which largely negates any need for coming up with litigation
expenses unless and until the case is settled or won. In addition, use
and overuse of these "collateral sources" can serve to expand the
plaintiff's claim for "pain and suffering" damages, since pain and suffering awards are often based on a multiple of the collateral sources
expended by the claimant which are scheduled to be expanded under
various health care reforms. 7 Thus, in turn, subsidization of health
insurance by tort liability occurs because pain and suffering awards
are generally calculated as entitlements equal to three or more times
the cost of medical bills.8 This creates a manifest incentive for claimants to run up medical bills, especially in light of the fact that health
insurance companies, rather than patients themselves, pay those bills.
Consider the following:
e When Massachusetts amended its no-fault law in 1988 to raise the
threshold of economic damages required to bring a tort suit from
$500 to $2000, the median number of medical treatment visits per
claimant immediately rose from thirteen to thirty.9
* A study of tort claims from automobile accidents in Hawaii in
1990 showed that the median number of treatment visits by claim5

See Richard B. Schmitt, Slick Tactics: TrialLawyers Glide Past Critics With Aid of Potent

Trade Group, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1994, at 1 (discussing the political tactics of the trial
lawyers).
6 Jeffrey O'Connell & Robert H. Joost, GivingMotorists a Choice Between Fault and NoFaultInsurance, 72 VA. L. REv. 61, 70-71 (1986).
7 Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposalto Abolish Defendants'PaymentsforPain and Suffering in
Return for Payment of Claimants'Attorneys' Fees, U. ILL L. RF'v. 333, 334-39 (1981).
8 H. LAWRENCE Ross, SETLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMs ADJUSTMENTS 107-08 (1970).
9 Sarah S. Marter & Herbert L. Weisberg, MedicalExpenses and the Massachusetts Automobile Tort Reform Law: A FirstReview of 1989 Bodily Injuiy Liability Claims, 10J. INS. REG. 462,
488 tbl. 12 (1992).
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ants to chiropractors was fifty-eight, with one-quarter of such claimants having more than eighty-four visits. 10
e In 1993, state authorities in New Jersey conducted a sting operation, staging a fake bus crash after which seventeen people raced to
get on the bus in order to claim they had been injured. Two others
filed tort claims without ever having been at the scene. Indeed, potential claimants had been motivated to monitor police radio frequencies to hear of an accident at which they could arrive before
the police in order to make an injury claim.'1
As part of the sting, some of the investigators agreed to be
treated, and were taken to chiropractors or physicians who provided 10-minute... treatments three times a week for up to 15
weeks. The doctors charged between $4500 and $6000 for the
unneeded care and often padded the bills with numerous treat12
ments that never took place.
New Jersey state insurance officials expressed fears that national
health care reform would not "contend with the tens of billions of
health care dollars or more lost each year to [such] insurance
3
fraud."1
Note further that efforts to include (at least eventually) more mental
health care in health insurance coverage 14 will likely serve to inflate
costs even more because plaintiffs can use such care to substantiate
claims for mental suffering.' 5 Health insurance now typically offers
16
sparse coverage for such care.
D.

Present Tort Reform Proposals

Health care debates usually focus only on medical malpractice
reform as the element of legal reform to accompany health insurance
reform generally. But, in fact, medical malpractice is only a small part
of the total personal injury tort system.' 7 As can be perceived from
10
(1991).
11

INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTOMOBILE INJURY CLAIMS IN HAWAII,

2, 26-27

Peter Kerr, 'Ghost Riders'areTarget of an InsuranceSting,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1993, at

Al.

Id. at D2.
Peter Kerr, Jersey's Insurance Sting- Cashing in on a Crash Without Pain and Suffering,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1993, § 4 (Week in Review), at 2.
14 Peter Passell, The Health Care Plan Could Worsen Injury-ClaimAbuses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 1993, at D2.
15 See, e.g., Waddle v. Sparks, 331 S.E.2d 22, 27 (N.C. 1992) (mental suffering may be
proved by expert medical testimony); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (Mass.
1982) (same).
16 MacNeil/LehrerNewsHour, (Sept. 22, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, Transcript 4760.
12
13

17

See, e.g., INSURANCE INFORMATION INsTITUTE, THE FACT BooK, 1993: PROPERTY/CAS-

UALTY INSURANCE FACTS 16 (indicating, for example, that in 1991 net automobile liability

premiums for automobile liability coverage totalled $63 billion versus approximately $4
billion for medical malpractice premiums).
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the foregoing material, the personal injury tort system as a wholeincluding injuries from auto accidents, manufactured products, slips
and falls, and other sources-must be considered as a factor of rising
medical costs. Indeed, as also can be perceived from the foregoing
material, by expanding both the number of insureds and the scope of
basic coverage available not only for the newly insured but also for
many others, reforms are also likely to expand the already inflationary
effects of health insurance on tort liability insurance and vice versa.
Professor Gary Schwartz, in his Article in this symposium, disputes the above conclusion:
If a national health program is adopted, judges would be aware that
the insurance mandated by federal law now covers accident victims
for the medical care they need. Granted, those victims' income
losses would remain; still, judges might be less inclined to rely on
loss-spreading notions to approve either individual verdicts or new
causes of action. If so, then the growth of tort liability would be
constrained.
... In short, the implementation of a national program would
tend to constrict both the effective scope and the actual cost of the
current regime of tort liability. At the least, that program would
slow down the rate at which the current tort system would otherwise
18
grow.
In addition to the data and arguments I have presented above,
another facet of my reply to Professor Schwartz's point lies in the aftermath of enactment of both workers' compensation and no-fault
auto insurance, both, in effect, forms of health and disability insurance. By Professor Schwartz's reckoning, such a huge expansion of
accident benefits (including in both instances compensation for wage
loss) should have meant a corresponding contraction of tort disbursement. But in both instances tort claims have increasingly been pursued,1 9 arguably based on the subsidy effects of such health and
disability benefits on tort claims. And this has occurred despite explicit barriers in both instances to pursuing tort claims (in the form of
"sole remedy" provisions under workers' compensation and "threshold" provisions under no-fault auto insurance), barriers not present,
of course, when health benefits are simply provided without con20
straints on tort actions.
Proponents of health care reform may assert in reply that portions of their proposals to control health care costs will adequately
18 Gary T. Schwartz, A NationalHealth Care Program: What Its Effect Would Be on American Tort Law and MalpracticeLaw, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1339, 1354 (1994).

19 O'Connell & Joost, supra note 6, at 70-72; Jeffrey O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance:
Back by PopularDemand?, 26 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 993, 995-99 (1989).
20

Id.
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deal with all these problems.2 1 In the first place, interest in cutting
costs has waned in comparison with interest in expanding coverage as
health care reform has been formulated. 22 Even more basically, consider that throughout the world, under socialized and private health
insurance and any combination thereof, health care costs continue to
escalate. 23 Yet, nowhere in the world is there anything remotely comparable to the incentives to incur wasteful health care costs as is provided by America's combination of health insurance and tort law,
fueled by tort lawyers' contingent fees and huge payments for tort
claimants' pain and suffering. To retain these mutually reinforcing
combustibles while also expanding the base provided by health insurance will inevitably greatly increase all costs, even granting the (heroic?) assumption of the efficacy of reform efforts generally to deal
24
with rising health care costs.
The typical tort reform proposals contained in the congressional
reform plans, including those in the 1994 Republican "Contract with
America," mirror prior state tort reform proposals emanating from
the insurance industry as well as their insureds-and self-insuredswho provide goods and services. Such typical tort proposals simply
circumscribe the rights of the injured (by establishing, for example,
limits on pain and suffering, contingent fees, and joint and several
liability) .25 Not only do they unfairly favor only one side of the battle
between the injured and those who allegedly injure them, but they
also leave intact in every case the cumbersome basis of payment that
prompts cries for tort reform in the first place: basing payment on
fault and paying for pain and suffering (albeit with upper limits under
reform proposals). Caps on large pain and suffering awards also fail
to address abuses in minor cases leading to padding of claims and
ambulance chasing.
E.

Better-And Balanced-Reforms

Far more fair and sensible would be tort reform providing not
only relief for defendants from undue tort burdens but a genuine
quid pro quo for the injured through better liability insurance involv21 For an indication of the imaginative steps that can be expected to evade health
care cost controls, see Rick Wartzman & Hilary Stout, Shifting Incentives: Some Seek Profit As
White House Mulls Curbs on Health Costs, WALL ST. J., May 4, 1993, at Al.
22 E.g., Robert Pear, Cost is Obscured in Health Debate-Focus on Universal Coverage
Eclipses a StartingIssue N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 7, 1994, at 1; Stephen Pearlstein, ContainingSpiraling Medical Costs Isn't Popular Topic With Reformers, WASH. PosT, Jul. 27, 1994, at A13.
23
Philip J. Boyle & Daniel Callahan, Minds and Hearts: Prioritiesin Mental Health Services, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Sept. 1993, at S3, S3-S4.
24 Passell, supra note 14, at D2.
25 Health Care: Clinton's Plan and the Alternatives, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1993, at 22; Joan
Biskupic, To DiscourageLawsuits, House GOP Would PreemptState Laws, WASH. Posr, Dec. 15,
1994, at A25.
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ing fewer disputes and quicker payment for unreimbursed economic
losses. Such coverage would include not only health care costs, such
as rehabilitation, which is often not covered under private, public, or
social insurance, but wage loss as well. Such coverage, as will be
demonstrated below, can also result in better and less expensive insurance for both hard-pressed consumers and providers of goods and
services.
1. Auto Insurance Reform
In accord with the foregoing, federal health insurance reform
should offer motorists the option of being paid promptly for their unreimbursed out-of-pocket losses from personal injury in auto accidents, without reference to fault, along with the right to opt out of
suing and being sued for pain and suffering, thereby greatly reducing
26
any incentives to pad medical bills.
2.

Beyond Auto Insurance

Concerning other personal injury claims-such as those for medical malpractice, defective products, and occupier's liability-reform
should offer defendants the choice of eliminating pain and suffering
claims when an offer is promptly made (within, for example, ninety
days of a claim) to pay periodically for an injured party's actual eco27
nomic losses, plus a reduced claimant's attorney's fee.
Estimates are that such reforms for auto and other claims, by
eliminating inducements to pad claims and greatly reducing lawyers'
fees (on both sides), could save in the vicinity of thirty billion dollars
in annual insurance costs. 28 Such savings could indeed be viewed as

making up for the almost inevitable increase in health insurance costs
26 Jeffrey O'Connell et al., Consumer Choice in the Auto InsuranceMarke 52 MD. L. REV.
1016 (1993) (explaining this proposal in more detail).
27 For a description of the plan and its underlying rationale, see Jeffrey O'Connell,
Two-Tier Tort Law: Neo No-Fault & Quasi-CriminalLiability, 27 WAKm FOREST L. REv. 871
(1992).
28 For an indication of the huge savings from automobile insurance alone, see
O'Connell et al., supra note 26. See alsoJeffrey O'Connell & Michael Horowitz, A Look at
...
Hidden Health Hazards-The Lauyer Will See You Now: Health Reform's Tort Crisis, WASH.
PosT, June 13, 1993, at C3. For a study indicating that the expansionary trend of product
liability law seemed to end, beginning in the mid-1980s, see James A. Henderson & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in ProductsLiability: An EmpiricalStudy of Legal Change,
37 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990). But seeA. HAVENNER, NOT QUITE A REvoLtrrION IN PRODUCT
LIArILrnr (1990) (recalculating the data in Henderson & Eisenberg, supra, and finding at

most only a stabilization in product filings and recoveries in federal district courts at far
higher levels than for a decade earlier); 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY ON
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 265-78 (1991) (analyzing the increasing
social costs of products liability litigation). Certainly no such stabilization is seen for auto
accident claims. See O'Connell et al., supra note 26, at 1021-24.
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accompanying any increases in the number of insureds and the scope
of coverage.
F.

The Politics of Reform

Of course it is true that such tort reforms will face bitter-and
hugely powerful-opposition from the plaintiffs' personal injury bar.
Speaking of the very modest proposals for tort reform included for
medical malpractice claims in the original Clinton administration's
health care reform proposal (the most stringent of which would only
29
cap contingent fees at one-third of any award),
Robert Berenson, a Washington internist who co-chaired the administration's working group on medical-malpractice reform, sa[id] he
wondered whether the trial lawyers' strong support for fellow lawyers Bill and Hillary Clinton during the campaign-ATLA [The Association of Trial Lawyers of America] members contributed about
$500,000-just might have played a role. Dr. Berenson sa[id] he
and some others in the working group sought much tougher
30
changes.., but were ignored by the White House.
The plaintiffs' personal injury bar31 has certainly long shown
great political strength and sophistication in protecting its interests,
32
especially in developing powerful ties with the Democratic Party.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
30 Schmitt, supra note 5, at 1; see also Morton Kondracke, Latest Winners of Health Insurance Fight: Trial Lawyers, Rou.. CALL, Aug. 6, 1994, at 6.
31
For a list of 63 plaintiffi' attorneys who each made more than $2 million in both
1989 and 1988, see Peter Bremilow & Leslie Spender, The Best Paid Lawyers in America,
FoRBES, Oct. 16, 1989, at 197.
32 Id.; see Paul A. Gigot, Dems Step Up To Well-Stocked PlaintiffBar, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4,
1992, at A8; Paul A. Gigot, Bill Clinton Bellies Up To The Tort Bar,WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1992,
at A16. According to the Wall StreetJournai " [t] he plaintiffs' bar, especially the Association
of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), has become the most important single fund-raising
source for liberal Democrats." LitigationLiberalism, WALL ST.J., May 12, 1992, atA24. Consider the following account of the defeat by the U.S. Senate of a federal bill changing
product liability law (for criticisms of this bill on its merits, including those from Jeffrey
O'Connell, see Passell, supra note 14, at D2): At the Senate Democratic caucus, Senator
Howell Heflin, a former Alabama Supreme Court justice and trial lawyer, declared that
"Jews, labor unions, and trial lawyers" are the three most important financial supporters of
the Democratic party, with the result that Democratic "Senators cannot afford to let the
trial lawyers down by passing a bill [that such lawyers] oppose." (The bill was then defeated by Democratic votes.) Tort Song Tragedy, WALL ST.J., Sept. 18, 1992, at A14; see also
Senatorts,WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1994, at A12 (commenting on Senator Heflin's statement);
Sara Fritz, Washington Lobbyists Foresee a New Era, L.A. TniEs, Nov. 9,1992, atA14 (discussing
changes in lobbying power associated with the change in administration); Stephen
Labaton, With Gifts From All Sides, Who Gets Clinton's Ear?,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1992, at 34
(discussing competition between interest groups including trial lawyers). For documentation of the huge amounts contributed by plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers, overwhelmingly
to Democrats, see AMERICAN TORT REFORM Ass'N (ATRA), AMEuCA's THIRD PoLTICAL
PARTYr A STUDY OF POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PLAInFF's LAWYER INDUSTRY (Undated but published in 1994), summarized in Leslie Spencer, America's Third PoliticalParty,
FoRBES, Oct. 24, 1994, at 60.
29
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Plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers are among the relatively rare wealthy
contributors to Democratic politicians who give to them out of preference, as opposed to simply trying to assure access to an incumbent or
a likely incumbent-to-be.3 3 Generally speaking, aside from some "limousine liberals" and members of the entertainment industry, who else
among the wealthy routinely prefers to contribute to Democrats at
both the state and federal level?3 4 In many respects, too, the Democratic party is a natural base for the pursuit of the interests of the
plaintiffs' personal injury bar. Relatively large numbers of personal
injury lawyers are members of ethnic minority groups, as is true of
Democrats generally-e.g., Jewish, Irish, Italian, Hispanic, AfricanAmerican, etc.3 5 They also tend to be generally sympathetic to important Democratic party issues and concerns, including civil rights, civil
liberties, and the redistribution of income.3 6 Reallocating wealth is,
after all, part of their business. In short, although wealthy and influential, they are not part of the establishment. They do not, for example, serve on boards of directors of corporations. On the contrary,
they are in the business of suing the establishment. Finally, as lawyers
they are often active in, or at least comfortable with, political and legislative matters. And they are individuals, spread all over the country
in community after community with corresponding access to both
state and federal officeholders. This access is in contrast to insurance
companies, which are relatively few in number and location, and bear
the political taint of being large corporations.
The plaintiffs' personal injury bar can also plausibly align itself
with society's unfortunates-the injured-and with consumer groups
in attacking large institutions which can be seen as either causing injuries or insuring those that do, especially in view of the one-sided tort
reforms urged by the insurance industry and its allies. In this connec33

See sources cited supranote 32. The following anecdote is pertinent: A Washington

lawyer-lobbyist, formerly a power in his home state's Democratic party, went to one of his
state's Democratic senators for whom he had raised substantial amounts of campaign
money. The lobbyist wanted the Senator to include an amendment to a federal product
liability bill (see note 22 supra) favorable to a manufacturer in their home state. The Senator replied that he couldn't touch anything that curbs tort law. He explained that
although he gets a lot of money from business interests, those interests would desert him in
a moment, and give three or four times what they give him, to a really promising Republican challenger. On the other hand, the plaintiffs' bar, he said, is with him first, last and
always. And their only price is no interference with personal injury law. So, he said, much
as he'd like to help, he'd have to pass. Confidential personal conversation with the author
(July 1989).
34
For analysis of the lack of political sophistication typical of theatrical people see
Kim Masters, Hollywood Strikes Back! Cause Celebrities Defend Their Potomac Presence, WASH.
Posr, May 25, 1993, at B1; see also Richard Grenier, Hurray For Hollywood, THE TIMEs
(LONDON), July 23, 1993 (Literary Supplement), at 10.
35
On the background-including ethnicity-of the plaintiffs' personal injury bar,
see JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAwsurr LOTTERY. ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN 146-49 (1979).
36
Id. at xi, 135-36, 146-48.
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tion, having the almost uniformly unpopular insurance industry as an
enemy gives the personal injury bar another huge advantage.
While the insurance industry and its allies undoubtedly also have
great lobbying power, they, unlike the personal injury bar, are not a
"single interest" lobbying force. This brings us to another source of
the plaintiffs' lawyers' great lobbying strength: they have only one
item on their legislative agenda, namely, the preservation of the tort
system. The personal injury bar can therefore concentrate all its attention on this one issue-it not only lobbies for only one thing, but
that one thing is a request to legislators only to refrainfrom acting, i.e.,
to keep the tort system intact. The insurance industry, on the other
hand, faces myriad legislative issues, including regulatory, tax, and
health care issues, in addition to changes in tort law, and many of its
interests require changes in the law. Nor can the insurance industry
speak with uniformity on changes in tort law. Some insurers are not
all that anxious to see fundamental changes. Finally, the insurance
industry is only one among many business interests supporting more
conservative (usually Republican) candidates, in contrast to plaintiffs'
lawyers' relatively rare status as affluent contributors to Democrats as a
37
first choice.
CONCLUSION

Even granting all the comparative political muscle of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), how much sense does it really make to even consider (either by public or private means)
sweeping and binding changes in the way health care is financed and
delivered in the United States, overriding many existing practices, including many covered now by state law,38 while doing very little about
medical malpractice tort claims and absolutely nothing about personal injury tort claims generally? After all, one can make a convincing case that despite the inadequacies in the availability and delivery
of health care in the United States, the American public benefits far
more from the delivery of its health care than from its legal services
under personal injury law. So it may be that, given the vast array of
variables that enter into our health care system, especially uncontrollable costs, all the waste of the tort liability system may seem too
tempting a target despite the legendary lobbying power of ATLA37 See supra notes 22-23. See generally Schmitt, supra note 5 (extensively documenting
the extraordinary lobbying power of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA)).
38 For a stunning indication-and defense-of how veiy radical the Clinton health
care proposal was (and not only for health care but as a precursor to winning "greater
justice in education, housing, jobs, and all the other goods and chances we [Americans]
now distribute so unfairly") see Ronald Dworkin, Will Clinton's Plan Be Fair?,N.Y. REv.,Jan.
13, 1994, at 20, 25.
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especially too after the results of the 1994 elections at both the federal
39
and state levels.
In this connection, a key player in the search for sensible health
insurance reform (and especially the dollars to fund it) may be Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NewYork), now the Ranking Minority
Member of the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, who has long been
widely recognized as an expert on social insurance. Luckily, he is no
stranger to tort-related issues. Over a quarter century ago, then Professor Moynihan focused with his typical clairvoyance and clarity on
the ills of tort liability as applied to auto accidents:
In the present stage of motor-vehicle transportation, accidents...
typically involve a whole range of contributory factors for which the
concept of a single "cause" or "negligent party" is very near to
absurd.
The result is an insurance system that is inherently unstable.
The number of... claims and counterclaims [goes up]. The victim
has every reason to exaggerate his losses.... The [insurance] company has every reason to resist....

Delay, fraud, contentiousness

are maximized, and in the process the system becomes grossly inefficient and expensive.
Automobile accident litigation has become a twentieth century
equivalent of Dickens's Court of Chancery, eating up the pittance of
39

Peter Passell, Civil Justice System Is Overall Targe4 N.Y. TIMSs, Jan. 27, 1995, at B7.

For a tongue-in-cheek idea applying proposed reform of medical services to legal services,
consider the following:
The system [of inaccessible and/or expensive legal services] demands
change. We should have a system of National Legal Care that would assure
all Americans a lifetime of the finest legal care. The lowliest purse snatcher
should be assured of legal care equal to that of the wealthiest Wall Street
swindler. And at reasonable prices. Or no price, for those who don't have
money, or prefer spending their money on fun things.
This could be done by breaking up the big law firms and assigning
lawyers to Legal Maintenance Organizations. Then all Americans could
have their choice of which LMO they want to belong to.
To cut down on waste, the government could establish a bureaucracy-or require states to do it-that would decide how much a lawyer
could charge for any service and to reject needless meetings, phone calls,
briefs, motions and other bill-padding practices.
They could also set limits on how much lawyers could earn a year and
how much they could spend on ties and tasseled loafers.
The bureaucracy could also set other professional quotas, such as how
many lawyers can specialize. That could force many lawyers who chase ambulances to instead settle family disputes over who inherits grandpa's ...
flat.
And who would administer this new, fair, Comprehensive Legal Care
system? The answer is obvious. A panel of impartial doctors.
Mike Royko, Americans Deserve Lauyer in Evey Pot, CHI. TRiB., Dec. 15, 1993, at 3.
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widows and orphans, a vale from which few return with their respect
40

for justice undiminished.
Returning to the topic some five years later, but focusing on
products liability and medical malpractice claims, then Ambassador
Moynihan spoke of not wanting to see "us litigating ourselves into a
stalemated and paranoid society. We could do so.... And that would

be such a waste, such a loss."41 Speaking of a congressional study on
medical malpractice subtitled "The Patient Versus the Physician," 4 2 he
described this relationship as one that
won't help doctors and.., won't help patients. Similar confrontational, adversarial relations seem to be developing everywhere.
They can't succeed. When everyone sues, no one gets satisfied.
Our experience with the automobile brought us after the fact to
that realization .... The legal system becomes ever more encumbered; the consequences of this burden become ever more patho43
logic ....This is the way systems die.
So, at long last, now Senator Moynihan-and the rest of us-are
in a position where we really must do something about liability insurance as it affects health insurance coverage. Indeed if health care coverage-whether expanded or not-continues to be unaccompanied at
either the federal or state level by the type of tort reform advocated
herein, then the mutually reinforcing adverse effects of health and
liability insurance on each other will continue to grow apace.
II
THE DATA

Jeffrey O'Connell, PhillipA. Bock44 & Stewart Petoe4 5
In 1964, Alfred Conard, James Morgan, and several of their colleagues from the University of Michigan completed a comprehensive
study of the various systems compensating injury and illness in the
United States ("loss-shifting systems").46 The Conard-Morgan study
40

DANIEL P. MoYNIHAN, COPING: ESSAYS ON THE PRAcICE OF GOVERNMENT 104-05

(1973) (reprinting a 1967 essay).
41

Daniel P. Moynihan, ForewordtoJEFFREY O'CoNNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY. No-

FAULT INSURANcE FOR PRODUCrS AND SERVICES, at xx (1975).
42
SUBCOMMrrrEE ON EXEcUTIVE REORGANIZATION, SENATE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.

(1969).
43
44

Id.
B.A., Augustana College, 1989; M.A, University of Illinois, 1991;J.D., University of

Virginia, 1994, joining only as to Part II.

45

B.A., College of William & Mary, 1992; J.D., University of Virginia, 1994, joining

only as to Part II.
46
ALFRED F. CoNARD, JAMES N. MORGAN, ROBERT W. PRATr, JR., CHARLES E. VOLTZ &
ROBERT L. BOMBAUGH, AuToMOBILE AccmENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE EcONOMICS OF INjuRY REPARATION (1964) [hereinafter CONARD-MoRGAN].
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focused on benefit payments by the nine primary loss-shifting systems
during 1960: Tort Liability; 47 Workers' Compensation; 48 Private Loss
Insurance; 49 Sick Leave; 50 Social Insurance; 5 1 Public Assistance; 5 2 Veterans' Benefits; 53 Public Health;5 4 and Private Health. 55 As the authors intended, their study created a "pool of data"5 6 -and a
technique useful for scholars studying loss-shifting systems in empirical ways.
The Conard-Morgan study has been twice updated by the senior
author of this Article in conjunction with two different co-authors. In
1986, the first update, Compensationfor Injury &Illness: An Update of the
Conard-Morgan Tabulations,57 replicated the empirical efforts of Conard-Morgan, showing developments in injury and illness reparations
during 1982. In addition, this first update discussed at some length
the numerous systems available for injury and illness compensation. 58
In 1988, the senior author and another co-author replicated ConardMorgan's empirical efforts in a second update, An IrrationalCombination: The Relative Expansion of Liability Insurance and Contraction of Loss
Insurance,59 this time with data for the benefits paid during 1984. Like
its predecessor, the second update detailed the benefits paid for'injury and illness by the various loss-shifting systems. In addition to
compiling the most recent descriptive statistics on benefits payments
in the United States, the second update analyzed a significant increase
47 For an extensive discussion of this system, see Jeffrey O'Connell &Jay Barker, Compensationfor Injuiy & Illness: An Update of the Conard-Morgan Tabulations,47 OHIO ST. LJ.
913, 928-30, 933-34 (1986).
48 For an extensive discussion of this system, see id. at 931-33.
49 For an extensive discussion of this system, see id. at 934-36.
50 For an extensive discussion of this system, see id. at 936-38.
51 For an extensive discussion of this system, see id. at 938-46.
52 For an extensive discussion of this system, see id. at 946-48.
53 For an extensive discussion of this system, see id, at 948-49.
54 This system is composed of expenditures from public health service facilities, combining expenditures by "state and local hospitals" (not offset by other revenues) and by
"other public programs for personal health care," including "program spending for maternal and child health; vocational rehabilitation medical payments; temporary disability insurance medical payments; Public Health Service and other Federal hospitals; Indian
health services; alcoholism, drug abuse, and mental health; and school health." OFFICE OF
RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF

HEALTH

AND

HUMAN

SERVICES,

HEALTH

CARE FINANCING REV., Summer 1990, at 39 tbl. 22.
55 This system covers expenditures by private health services facilities and includes
"[slpending by philanthropic organizations, industrial inplant health services, and privately financed [health] construction." OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATIONS, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv., Fall 1985, at 10, 11
n.1 & tbl. 3.
56 See CONARD-MORGAN, supra note 46, at 2.
57 See O'Connell & Barker, supra note 47.
58 Id. at 927-49.
59 Jeffrey O'Connell &James Guinivan, An IrrationalCombination: The Relative Expansion of Liability Insuranceand Contraction of Loss Insurance,49 OHIO ST. L.J. 757 (1988).
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in the amount of Tort Liability payments. The second update found
that Tort Liability payments had increased not only in terms of dollars
paid, but also in terms of the relative percentage of total benefits paid
during 1984, as that article's title indicates. 60 As described in the second update, Tort Liability expands through the decisions of judges
and juries as they allocate individual, case-specific compensation without much consideration of the overall cost of such a system. 61 As a
result, Tort Liability payments are subject to far fewer budgetary controls-whether public or private-compared with the expenditures
from the other loss-shifting systems.
Presented here is a third update, detailing the benefits paid for
injury and illness during both 1988 and 1990.62 This latest updating
effort confirms a trend first explicitly noted in the second update:
Tort Liability continues to grow in relation to other loss-shifting
63
systems.
A.

Descriptive Statistics

The benefits paid for injury and illness by the primary loss-shifting systems during 1960, 1982, 1984, 1988, and 1990 are detailed in
Appendices to this Article. As in the first and second updates, this
third update uses the loss-shifting categories originally assembled in
the Conard-Morgan study. Tables 1 through 4 and the Graphs accompanying Tables 1 and 3, which present the benefits statistics in different ways, are analyzed below.
Our analysis of the loss-shifting systems begins with a look at the
relative benefits paid from each system. While it is instructive to compare the expenditures by various systems, as we do in Tables 3 and 4
and the companion Graph to Table 3, more striking are the revelations produced in Table 1, Relative Percentages of Benefits Paid for
Injury and Illness From Each of the Principal Loss-Shifting Systems,
1960-1990, which shows the relative amount of benefits paid for each
system during a given year. The percentages shown reflect the comparisons of each loss-shifting system's benefits with the total benefits
paid for injury and illness during a given year. In turn, such statistics
Id. at 759.
Id.
Comprehensive figures for 1990 are the most recent available from the varied reporting services. The authors do not anticipate, however, any major changes in benefit
payments that would affect the trends discussed herein.
60
61
62

63

See ROBERT W. STURGIS, TORT Cosr TRENDS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1992)

for a study finding similar results. See also SaraJ. Harty, Tort Costs Grow Fasterthan Economy,
Bus. INS., Oct. 19, 1992, at 1, 1, 38 (detailing the primary conclusions of the Sturgis study);
cf RobertJ. Samuelson, Still No Free Lunch, WASH. PosT, Apr. 7, 1993, at A27 (arguing that
rising legal costs are a disproportionate part of a general increase in non-wage costs of
businesses).
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make possible a comparison of an individual loss-shifting system
against any of the other systems. This permits an analysis of changes
in the ways individual systems relate with other systems and with the
total universe of benefits paid during any given year.
TABLE 1
RELATIVE PERCENTAGES OF BENEFITS PAID FOR INJURY AND
ILLNESS WITHIN EACH OF THE PRINCIPAL
SHIFTING SYSTEMS,

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Tort Liability
Workers' Compensation
Private Loss Insurance
Sick Leave
Social Insurance
Public Assistance
Veterans
Public Health
Private Health

Loss-

1960-1990.

A
1960

B
1982

C
1984

D
1988

E
1990

7.9%
5.4%
36.5%
5.1%
18.1%
6.3%
7.4%
9.4%
4.0%
100.0%

6.7%
5.1%
29.6%
3.1%
31.9%
11.2%
5.5%
3.8%
3.1%
100.0%

7.4%
5.3%
31.3%
3.2%
30.5%
11.2%
5.0%
3.2%
2.8%
100.0%

9.0%
5.7%
32.6%
2.9%
27.8%
11.1%
3.8%
3.0%
4.1%
100.0%

9.1%
5.8%
33.0%
2.7%
27.2%
11.8%
3.4%
2.8%
4.3%
100.0%

Note in particular that during 1960 Tort Liability was responsible
64
for 7.9% of the total benefits paid for injury and illness (Cell Al).
By 1982, the percentage of total benefits paid for Tort Liability was
down to 6.7% (Cell B1), a decrease arguably reflecting dramatic increases in Social Insurance (especially Medicare) and Public Assistance (especially Medicaid). (In effect, we hypothesize that Medicare
and Medicaid grew so fast that it took some time for tort law to correspondingly catch on-and up.) Later, however, the benefits paid for
Tort Liability increased relative to all other benefits paid, including
Medicare and Medicaid, climbing to 7.4% of benefits paid during
1984 (Cell Cl), to 9.0% during 1988 (Cell Dl), and to 9.1% during
1990 (Cell El). From 1982 to 1990, then, Tort Liability increasingly
took larger portions of the total benefits "pie."
Increases in Tort Liability relative to the total benefits paid may
be compared to changes in the other loss-shifting systems. For example, in 1960, 5.4% of the total benefits paid for injury and illness were
paid for Workers' Compensation (Cell A2). In each of the successive
years studied, the percentage of total benefits attributable to Workers'
64 Throughout this Article, we refer to figures found in the attached Tables by their
respective cell coordinates within such Tables. For example, the figure given for Tort Liability payments during 1960, 7.9%, is located in Table I at Column A, Row 1: thus, Cell Al.
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Compensation changed only to 5.1% in 1982 (Cell B2), to 5.3% in
1984 (Cell C2), to 5.7% in 1988 (Cell D2), and to 5.8% in 1990 (Cell
E2). Since both Tort Liability and Workers' Compensation payments
increased in terms of dollar expenditures during those years, 65 the
perspective gained by looking at expenditures relative to the total universe of benefits paid is a useful one. Although both Workers' Compensation and Tort Liability increased, tort claims took increasingly
larger pieces of the benefits pie. The same is true with respect to Tort
Liability's relationship to other loss-shifting systems.
The relationships depicted in Table 1 are recreated in its companion Graph, Relative Percentages of Benefits Paid for Injury and
Illness From Each of the Principal Loss-Shifting Systems, 1960-1990.
Note the successive steps in Tort Liability, each representing an
increase in Tort Liability's share of the total benefits paid. Such a
visual analysis is helpful in understanding the way each loss-shifting
system relates to the entire universe of injury and illness reparations.
As the Graph shows, only the increases in Private Loss Insurance
(principally employer-provided fringe benefits) rivalled those of Tort
Liability in terms of taking larger portions of the benefits pie during
the 1980s. During the same period, the other loss-shifting systems decreased or increased only slightly in relation to the total benefits paid.
Table 2, Periodic Changes in the Relative Percentages of Benefits
Paid for Injury and Illness From Each of the Principal Loss-Shifting
Systems, 1960-1990, underscores several of the points raised in Table
1.
TABLE 2
PERIODIC CHANGES IN THE RELATIVE PERCENTAGES OF

BENEFITS PAID FOR INJURY AND ILLNESS WITHIN
EACH OF THE PRINCIPAL LOSS-SHIFTn'G

SYSTEMS, 1960-1990.

A
B
C
D
1960-1982 1982-1984 1984-1988 1988-1990
1 Tort Liability
2 Workers' Compensation
3 Private Loss Insurance
4 Sick Leave
5 Social Insurance

-1.22%
-0.30%

+0.72%
+0.22%

+1.59%
+0.33%

+0.11%
+0.09%

-6.89%
-2.00%
+13.76%

+1.69%
+0.16%
-1.39%

+1.35%
-0.33%
-2.71%

+0.35%
-0.20%
-0.54%

6 Public Assistance
7 Veterans

+4.99%
-1.84%

-0.02%
-0.48%

-0.13%
-1.22%

+0.73%
-0.45%

8 Public Health

-5.61%

-0.55%

-0.20%

-0.23%

9 Private Health

-0.90%

-0.34%

+1.32%

+0.14%

65

See infra Table 3 (Cells Al-El and A2-E2).
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This Table shows periodic changes in the relationships between
each of the various loss-shifting systems and the total benefits paid.
For example, Tort Liability's relative percentage of the total benefits
paid decreased between 1960 and 1982 (Cell Al), a change caused by
huge increases in Social Insurance (Cell AS) and Public Assistance
(Cell A6), as suggested above. Between 1982 and 1984, however, the
percentage of total benefits attributable to Tort Liability increased by
0.72% (Cell Bi), an increase second only to that of Private Loss Insurance (Cell B3). Then, again, between 1984 and 1988, Tort Liability's
percentage of the total benefits paid increased, this time by 1.59%
(Cell Cl), an increase larger than that of any other loss-shifting system. Thus, not only did Tort Liability's relative share of the total benefits pie increase, but, during the 1984-1988 period, its relative share
increased faster than any other loss-shifting system. Between 1988 and
1990, Tort Liability's relative share of the total benefits paid increased
by 0.11% (Cell D1), which was less than the increases in Public Assistance, Private Loss Insurance, and Private Health.
While our analysis of the relative percentages of total benefits
paid provides the most provocative findings regarding Tort Liability, a
look at the changes in dollar expenditures among the various lossshifting systems is also informative. As mentioned earlier, all of the
systems have continued to grow in terms of dollar expenditures. 66 Table 3, Benefits Paid for Injury and Illness by Principal Loss-Shifting
Systems, 1960-1990, summarizes the dollar expenditures from each of
the loss-shifting systems during 1960, 1982, 1984, 1988, and 1990.

66 Only the expenditures from Public Health decreased at any time during the thirty
year expenditure window, a decrease occurring sometime between 1982 and 1984. Table 3
(Cells B8 and C8).
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3

BENEFITS PAID FOR INJURY AND ILLNESS BY PRINCIPAL LossSHIFTING SYSTEMS,

1960-1990.

(DOLLARIs IN BILLIONS)

A
1960
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Tort Liability
Workers' Compensation
Private Loss Insurance
Sick Leave
Social Insurance
Public Assistance
Veterans
Public Health
Private Health

B
1982

C
1984

D
1988

E
1990

$1.9
1.3
8.7
1.2
4.3
1.5
1.8
2.3
1.0

$23.1
17.8
102.9
10.6
110.8
39.1
19.2
13.2
10.9

$29.5
21.4
125.3
12.9
122.1
44.9
20.2
13.0
11.2

$53.0
33.5
192.9
17.0
164.1
65.5
22.6
18.0
24.3

$65.3
41.5
237.5
19.3
196.0
85.1
24.3
20.3
30.6

$23.9

$347.5

$400.5

$590.9

$719.9

A closer scrutiny of the figures reported for each system shows
that, although each system's expenditures have increased, the magnitudes of these changes differ. For example, during 1960, the expenditures from Private Loss Insurance (principally employer-provided
health and disability coverages) were higher than those for any other
system (Cell A3), but in 1982, Social Insurance replaced Private Loss
Insurance as the highest paying loss-shifting system (Cell B5). By
1984, this situation reversed itself once again, and Private Loss Insurance recaptured the lead among loss-shifting systems in terms of dollars expended (Cell C3). This trend continued in 1988 (Cell D3) and
1990 (Cell E3), reflecting, we conjecture, recent special budgetary
constraints on Social Insurance, starting with the Reagan
administration.
Tort Liability ranked fourth among all loss-shifting systems during each of the five years studied. In 1988 and 1990 the expenditures
from Tort Liability (Cell D1), while much lower than those from Private Loss Insurance (Cell D3) and Social Insurance (Cell D5) and
somewhat lower than from Public Assistance (Cell D6), were higher
than any of the remaining systems' expenditures.
The figures from Table 3 are hereby graphically presented: Benefits Paid for Injury and Illness by Principal Loss-Shifting Systems,
1960-1990.
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The periodic changes in dollar expenditures are displayed in Table 4, Changes in the Amounts of Benefits Paid From Each of the
Principal Loss-Shifting Systems.
TABLE 4
PERIODIC CHANGES IN THE AMOUNTS OF BENEFITS PAID WrrHIN EACH

OF THE PRINCIPAL LOSS-SHIFTING SYSTEMS.
B
or the Period 1960-1982
Amount of Increase
(dollars in millions)

Percentage
Change

Average Annual
Cange

Tort Liability
Workers' Compensation
Private Loss Insurance
Sick Leave
Social Insurance
Public Assistance
Veterans
Public Health
Private Health

$21,240
$16,475
$94,132
$9,398
$106,423
$37,571
$17,407
$10,949
$9,935

1,127.4%
1,273.2%
1,078.3%
777.3%
2,456.1%
2,511.4%
989.0%
486A%
1,029.5%

+51.2%
+57.9%
+49.0%
+35.3%
+111.6%
+114.2%
+45.0%
+22.1%
+46.8%

TOTALS

$323,530

11,728.7%

+533.1%

D

E
For the Period 1982-1984

Amount of Increase
(dollars in millions)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Tort Liability
Workers' Compensation
Private Loss Insurance
Sick Leave
Social Insurance
Public Assistance
Veterans
Public Health
Private Health
TOTALS

$6,404
3,602
22,476
2,251
11,346
5,875
1,016
-200
300

+27.7%
+20.3%
+21.9%
+21.2%
+10.2%
+15.0%
+5.3%
-1.5%
+2.8%

$53,070
G

+122.9%
H
For the Period 1984-1988

Amount of Increase
(dollars in millions)
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Tort Liability
Workers' Compensation
Private Loss Insurance
Sick Leave
Social Insurance
Public Assistance
Veterans
Public Health
Private Health
TOTALS

Percentage
Change

Percentage
Change

TOTALS

+13.8%
+10.1%
+10.9%
+10.6%
+5.1%
+7.5%
+2.7%
-0.76%
+1.4%
+61.4%
I
Average Annual
Change

+79.4%
+56.8%
+53.9%
+32.4%
+34.4%
+45.8%
+11.8%
+38.5%
+117.0%

+19.9%
+14.2%
+13.5%
+8.1%
+8.6%
+11.4%
+3.0%
+9.6%
+29.2%

$190,383

+470.0%

+117.5%

Amount of Increase
(dollars in millions)
Tort Liability
Workers' Compensation
Private Loss Insurance
Sick Leave
Social Insurance
Public Assistance
Veterans
Public Health
Private Health

Average Annual
Change

$23,449
12,134
67,561
4,171
42,016
20,565
2,387
5,000
13,100

K
For the Period 1988-1990

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

F

$12,222
7,997
44,634
2,248
31,912
19,546
1,703
2,300
6,300
$129,010

Percentage
Change
+23.0%
+23.9%
+23.1%
+13.2%
+19.4%
+29.8%
+7.5%
+12.8%
+25.9%
+179.1%

L
Average Annual
Change
+11.5%
+11.9%
+11.6%
+6.6%
+9.7%
+14.9%
+3.8%
+6.4%
+13.0%
+85.3%
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We have presented such periodic changes in three ways. The first
set of columns of figures (A, D, G, and J) simply represents the increases in dollar payments. The second set of columns (B, E, H, and
K) represents the percentage increases in dollars expended during
the four periods. Finally, the third set of columns (C, F, I, and L)
represents the average annual percentage increases in dollars
expended.
As the Table shows, between 1960 and 1982, the increase in Tort
Liability payments (Cell Cl) ranked relatively low among the various
systems (Cell C1-C9). However, later time intervals tell a different
story. Between 1982 and 1984, Tort Liability's corresponding increase
(Cell F1) was the highest among all loss-shifting systems. Between
1984 and 1988, the average annual increase in benefits paid from Tort
Liability (Cell II) was second only to the increase in Private Health
expenditures (Cell 19). 67 Admittedly, for the period from 1988 to
1990, Tort Liability's increase lagged-but only slightly-behind
those of Public Assistance (Cell L6), Private Health (Cell L9), Private
Loss Insurance (Cell L3), and Workers' Compensation (Cell L2).
Although total Tort Liability payments ranked third or fourth in
total dollars of increase among all loss-shifting systems in each of the
five years studied (1960, 1982, 1984, 1988, and 1990), Table 4 shows
that during a six-year period Tort Liability payments increased faster
than any other system during the period from 1982 to 1984, and faster
than any of the top three ranked systems during the period 1984 to
1988. As a result, the gap between Tort Liability and the three largest
payment systems continued to decrease. Granted, as indicated above,
the figures from a recent two-year period, from 1988 to 1990, show a
slightly diminishing relative-but still substantial absolute-growth in
Tort Liability. Given Tort Liability's relative growth in the more statistically significant six-year period from 1982 to 1988, the plateauing of
Tort Liability's relative growth could well be temporary. And at the
least the idea that the growth of other more efficient compensation
systems will itself stem the growth of Tort Liability-with all its inefficiencies 6 8-seems questionable indeed.
This leads to one final point: All the above data-starting with
those of Professors Conard, Morgan, and their colleagues 69 -reflect
67 Between 1982 and 1984, however, the increase in Private Health benefits was only
1.4% (Cell F9). For a description of this system, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
68 For narrative, tabular, and graphic presentations of the hugely disproportionate
transaction costs under Tort Liability compared with other compensation systems, both
public and private, see CONARD-MoRoAN, supra note 46, at 60-61. For Professor Conard's
more recent discussion of this continuing phenomenon, see Alfred Conard, Who Pays in the
Endfor Injuy Compensation? Reflections on Wealth Transfersfrom the Innocent 30 SAN Dimo L.
REv. 283, 292 (1993).
69 CONA>MoRGAN, supra note 46.
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not total premiums or other amounts paid into any given compensation system, but only payments after deducting overhead and other
payers' (excluding payees') transaction costs. Given the huge transaction costs associated with the Tort Liability for both payers and payees
compared to other compensation systems, 70 increases in tort liability
of the dimensions recorded here seem particularly regrettable.
[Appendices A through E follow.]

70

See supra note 68.
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A

BENEFITS PAID FOR INJURY AND ILLNESS BY THE PRINCIPAL
LOSS-SHIFTING SYSTEMS,

1990

(DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)

Suirvivors
Tort Liability'
Auto Personal Injury
Insured
Uninsured
Other Personal Injury Insurance
Claims
Medical Malpractice
Other
Railroad & Motor Carriers
Total Tort Liability
7
Workers' Compensation
1,839
Other: (State)
(Railroad)
-Total Workers' Compensation
Private Loss Insurance"
Individual Policies
I 3,552 2
Group Policies
I 0,281'5
Total Private Loss Insurance
Sick Leave"
Social Insurance
OASDI
5(0,746-"
Railroad Retirement
Fed. Civil Service
4,699
Other Federal
973
1,799
State and Local
Medicare A
Medicare B
Total Social Insurance
Public Assistance 3'
Medicaid
General Assistance
SSI
Other
Total Public Assistance
Veterans 0
Public Health
Private Health 0
TOTAL ALL SYSTEMS

Disability

-

Medical

41,078-

-

21,212
3,224
40

2,400's
5,200 ' 6
19,277

493

-_

4,9334
14,9705
3,7256
65,199
38,238
3,2249
4010
41,502

15,187

5,800' 4
200,300' 7
-

24,8036,189
1,530
2,517
6,694279
4,5452

21,752
215,781
237,533
19,277'9

9.1%

5.8%

33.0%
2.7%

75,549
2,758V
'10,888 4

54,24434,533 0

64,859
3,138
12,855
4,200
15,717 . 7

Total

% of
All
Benefits

-

8,5563
20,300
30,600

2,503r
4,316 6
60,938
39,078
196,030

27.2%

64,859 s2
3,138e
12,855'
4,200e'
85,052
24,273
20,300"0
30,600"'
$719,571

11.8%
3.4%
2.8%
4.3%
100.0%

'For a description of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at
928-30, 933-34. Because of the lump-sum nature of tort awards, these benefits cannot be
separated into the survivor, disability, and medical benefits components. Note also that
the figure for tort awards includes compensation for non-economic loss (such as pain and
suffering, which does not fall under any of the three subcategories), and does not include
certain tort payments (such as product liability or medical malpractice damages paid by
self-insuring institutions).
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2 This

figure was calculated as follows. First, the premiums paid for private and commercial auto policies were combined. Net Premiums Written for Private Passenger Auto
($78,393 million) were reduced by a combination of the Pure Loss Ratio (73.8%) and the
Loss Adjustment Expense (11.8%), and added to the Net Premiums Written for Commercial Auto ($16,974 million), which was also reduced by a combination of the Pure Loss
Ratio (65.3%) and the Loss Adjustment Expense (12.0%). So: [$78,393 million x 85.6%] +
[$16,974 x 77.3%] = $80,225 million. SeeJohn H. Snyder, Review and Preview: The Year of
the Cats, BEST'S REV., Feb. 1993, at 84-85, exhibits 11, 12. This figure was reduced by the
percentage of payouts for property damage (estimated to have been 32% in 1990, as in
1988, see note 2 to Appendix B). Thus, the total was reduced to $54,553 million. Finally,
the figure was reduced by the percentage of payouts for physical damage (estimated to
have been 24.7% in 1990, from a confidential source provided by a major auto insurer).
Thus, the final figure is $41,078 million. The calculations above reflect a change in
sources; the source used for this figure in earlier articles is no longer available. The
change in sources and calculations results in the following figure for 1988: $57,815 +
12,127 = 69,942, reduced by 32% (as in our earlier article) and then by 33% (a figure from
the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS' 1993 AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

26 tbl. 8, 37 tbl. 9). Thus, the final figure for 1988 is $31,866 million, which has
the effect of increasing to 9.4% the percentage of total premiums paid for tort liability.
3 This figure was computed by assuming that the personal injury payments made by motorists themselves, apart from liability coverage or from uninsured motorist coverage, amounted to 1.2% of the insured personal injury payments. This formula was used in CONARDMORGAN, supramain text note 46, at 50 n.54. Thus, $41,078 million x 1.2% = $492 million.
'Diane Ferraiolo, Medical Malpractice,Fidelity and Surety-1990, BEsT's REv., Dec. 1991, at
39, 39 and accompanying table. This figure represents premiums written for medical malpractice in 1990.
Snyder, supra note 2, at 84. This figure was computed by adjusting the Net Premiums
Written for Other Liability ($18,123 million) with a combination of the Pure Loss Ratio
(55.2%) and the Loss Adjustment Expense Ratio (27.4%). So: $18,123 million x 82.6% =
$14,970 million.
6This category of data is no longer available. For the sake of consistency with earlier studies, we have used a figure equal to 5.7% of total tort liability, which represents the percentage of 1960 tort awards paid by railroads and motor carriers. See CONARD-MoRGAN, supra
main text note 46, at 48 tbl. 1-2.
7For a description of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at
931-33.
8
SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY BuLLETIN, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 313 tbl. 9.B1 (1992).
9
1d. at 119 tbl. 3.A3. The figure given represents the benefits paid under short-term disability insurance, which employers in California, Hawaii, NewJersey, New York, Puerto Rico,
and Rhode Island are required by state law to provide to their employees. Short-term
disability insurance covers wage loss of employees unable to work because of nonoccupational injuries and illness. See C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. ET Al, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SE,cuRrrv: SOCIAL INSURANCE AND OTHER APPROACHES 255-67 (5th ed. 1982) (explaining these
insurance plans in more detail); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 11, § 203 (Supp. 1991).
0
DATABASE

' SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., supra note 8, at 119 tbl. 3.A3. The figure given represents benefits

provided under insurance which railroads are required by federal law to provide to their
employees to protect them in the case of short-term disability caused by nonoccupational
injury or illness. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 9, at 434-35 for a further explanation of
this coverage.
" For a description of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at
934-36.
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,2 See AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, 1992 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 46, 119-120.

Total death benefits from private insurance companies, veterans' life insurance, and fraternal life insurance were $27,285 million, of which $10,281 million came from group insurance policies and $17,004 million came from other plans. Id. Under plans other than
term insurance, death benefits include a return of savings roughly approximated by the
amount of reserves released by death in insurance company accounts. In calculating the
figure presented in this Appendix, we assume, for the sake of consistency with earlier articles, that the ratio of reserves released by death-to-total death benefits was 20.3%. So:
$17,004 million-(17,004 x 20.3%) = $13,552 million. For a fuller explanation, see N.Y.
(STATE)

INSURANCE DEP'T,

1984

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE,

STATISTICAL TABLES FROM ANNUAL STATEMENTS

1sHEALTH INSURANCE ASS'N OF AMERICA,

12, 15 tbl. 4, 21 & tbl. 10.

SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA

28 tbl.

2.7 (1992).
14 d.
15AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, supra note 12, at 46. Group policies provide almost entirely for loss-shifting, with very low transaction costs. See CONARD-MoRGAN, supra

main text note 46, at 50 n.58. Accordingly, no adjustment for transaction costs is provided.
'6 HEAmH INSURANCE ASS'N OF AMERICA, supra note 13, at 27 tbl. 2.5.
17See id at 26-28 tbls. 2.4, 2.5, 2.7. This figure was calculated by reducing the total benefit
payment by all insurers for medical expenses ($212,400 million, id. at 26 tbl. 2.4) by the
amount of benefits paid for individual policies ($8,200 million, id. at 28 tbl. 2.7), loss of
income payments ($5,200 million, id. at 27 tbl. 2.5), and duplicative administrative costs
($1,300 million, id. at 27 tbl. 2.6). So: $212,400 million - $8,200 million - ($5,200 million
- $1,300 million) = $200,300 million.

18For a description of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at
936-38.
9

See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1993 STATISTICAL ABmACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 380 tbl. 603. Of the total figure, $10,835 million was provided in sick leave

for government employees and $8,442 million was provided in sick leave for workers in
private employment. Id.
0 For a description of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at
938-46.
21
SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., supra note 8, at 148 tbl. 4.A5.

OADSI means Old Age, Survivors',

and Disability Insurance.
221d.
'

at 149 tbl. 4.A6.

SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN.,

Current OperatingStatistics, Soc. SEcuRrry BUL., Winter 1992, at 74,

113 tbl. 4A.1. The table used in earlier studies is no longer available. This figure was
calculated by estimating the amount of Railroad Retirement benefits that were paid for
disability. Between 1985 and 1988, 38% of the total Railroad Retirement benefits paid
were disability payments. See U.S. RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, STATISTICAL TABLES DATA
THROUGH

FISCAL YEAR 1990 tbls. BI, D1 (Product of number of awards and amount of

average award for each period = total amount of disability awarded, $18,198,000. Id. at tbl.
BI. The total compensation for the entire period is $48,550,000. Id. at tbl. Dl. The quotient of total disability and total compensation is 38%.). Thus, for 1990, $7,258 million x
38% = $2,758 million.
24
See Ann Y. Bixby, Benefits and Beneficiaries Under Public Employee Retirement Systems, Fiscal
Year 1990, Soc. SEcURInY BULL., Fall 1993, at 95, 96 tbl. 1 (the Sum of Disability, 6,189, and
Survivor Monthly and Lump Sum, 4,629 and 70).
' Id. (the sum of Other Federal, 147, and Armed Forces, 2,356. In previous years Armed
Forces figures were subsumed in Other Federal).
6
2 Id. (the sum of Disability, 2,517, and Survivor, 1,799, id.).
" SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., supra note 8, at 294 tbl. 8.B2.
2
2

Id. at 293 tbl. 8.B1.
Id. at 294 tbl. 8.B2.

3 Id. at 293 tbl. 8.B1.
' For a description of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at
946-48.
3
2 BUREU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 19, at 113 tbl. 162.
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This category of data is no longer available. For the sake of consistency with earlier
articles, the figure given is 3.69% of the total figure for public assistance, which is the same
proportion used in earlier studies. See O'Connell & Guinivan, supra main text note 59, at
768 n.27; O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at 924 tbl. E.
' SOCIAL SEc. ADMIN., supra note 8, at 271 tbl. 7.A4. SSI means Supplemental Security
Income. The figure given includes federal and state SSI payments for general disability
($12,521 million) and for blindness ($334 million), but does not include SSI old age payments. So: $12,521 million + $334 million = $12,855 million.
' Office of Research and Demonstrations, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, National Health Expenditures, 1990, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Fall 1991, at 29, 53 tbl. 13.
6
For a description of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at
948-49.
37 SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., supra note 23, at 113 tbl. 4.A1. This figure represents
a combination
of survivors and disability benefits.
" DEPARTMENT OF VETERANs AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 7, S-48 tbl. 22 (1990). This figure
excludes expenditures for service-connected diseases and injuries. It was computed by reducing the cost of VA-provided medical care ($11,500 million, id. at 7) by the percentage
of veterans who received medical and surgical treatments that were service related (25.6%
(quotient of veterans who received service-related medical treatment, 250,887, and total
number of patients, 981,887) id. at S-48 tbl. 22). CONARD-MORGAN, supra main text note
46, at 51 n.62 similarly excluded service-connected expenditures with this method of calculation.
59 Office of Research and Demonstrations, supra note 35, at 53 tbl. 13. This figure
includes
$14.1 billion reported for expenditures by "state and local hospitals" (not offset by other
revenues) and $6.2 billion reported for "other public programs for personal health care,"
including "program spending for maternal and child health; vocational rehabilitation
medical payments; temporary disability insurance medical payments; Public Health Service
and other Federal hospitals; Indian health services; alcoholism, drug abuse, and mental
health; and school health." Id.
'0 For a description of this category, see supra main text note 55.
41Office of Research and Demonstrations, supra note 35, at 49 tbl. 10.
'3
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APPENDIX

BENEFITS PAID FOR INJURY AND ILLNESS BY THE PRINCIPAL
LoSS-SHiFrING SYSTEMS,

1988

(DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)

Survivors
Tort Liability'
Auto Personal Injury
Insured
Uninsured
Other Personal Injury Insurance
Claims
Medical Malpractice
Other
Railroad & Motor Carriers
Total Tort Liability
Workers' Compensation7
Other: (State)
(Railroad)
Total Workers' Compensation
Private Loss Insurance"
Individual Policies
Group Policies
Total Private Loss Insurance
Sick Leave'
Social Insurance'
OASDI
Railroad Retirement
Fed. Civil Service
Other Federal
State and Local
Medicare A
Medicare B
Total Social Insurance
Public Assistance
Medicaid
General Assistance
SSI
Other
Total Public Assistance
Veterans 8
Public Health
Private Health"
TOTAL ALL SYSTEMS

-

Disability

-

_

Medical

-

_

_

-

-1,602

11,65312
9,346's

17,613
2,754
18

11,518
__

1,800's
4,600"'

4,70014
160,80017

% of
All
Benefits

Total

29,0202
348'

4,2784
16,3115
3,0206
52,977
30,733
2,7549
1810
33,505
18,153
174,746
192,899

9.0%

5.7%

-

17,029

-

17,029'9

32.6%
2.9%

44,787
1,763
3,805
830
1,129
-

21,692
777
4,016
1,479
1,961

-

66,479" '
2,5407,8212,3094
3,090e
51,139
30,740
164,118

27.8%

48,710"'
2,417-2
10,479"8
4
3,9003
65,506
22,570
18,00039
24,3004'
$590,904

11.1%
3.8%
3.0%
4.1%
100.0%

-3,499 6

5,4366
3,5448

45,70327
27,196r
48,710
2,417
3,900

10,479
11,34737

7,724 38
18,000
24,300

'For a description of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at
928-30, 933-34. Because of the lump-sum nature of tort awards, these benefits cannot be
separated into the survivor, disability, and medical benefits components. Note also that
the figure for tort awards includes compensation for noneconomic loss (such as pain and
suffering, which does not fall under any of the three subcategories), and does not include
certain tort payments (such as product liability or medical malpractice damages paid by
self-insuring institutions).
2

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

1991

STATISTICAL ABSTRA(CT

OF THE

521 tbl. 859. This figure was arrived at by assuming that 33% of automobile
liability payments are paid toward property damage and therefore should not be included
UNrrE) STATES

as benefits paid for injury and illness. The 33% figure comes from NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION

1993 AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE DATABASE 26 tbl. 8, 37 tbl. 9.
So: $43,313 million x 67% = $29,020 million. The 33% figure is used for 1988 versus the
35% for 1982 and 1984 to reflect a declining percentage for property damage liability. See
note 2 to Appendix A.
OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS,
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'This figure was computed by assuming that the personal injury payments made by motorists themselves, apart from liability coverage or from uninsured motorist coverage, amounted to 1.2% of the insured personal injury payments. This formula was used in CONARDMORGAN. See supra main text note 46, at 50 n.54. So: 29,020 million x 1.2% = $348 million.
4
BEST'S AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES: PROPERTY-CASUALTY 128 (50th ed. 1989). This figure
was calculated by multiplying Net Premiums Written for Medical Malpractice ($4,028 million) by a combination of the Pure Loss Ratio (74.1%) and the Loss Adjustment Expense
(32.1%). So: $4,028 million x 106.2% = $4,278 million.
'Id. at 130. The same formula was used as in supra note 4. So: $19,077 million x 85.5%
$16,311 million.
'This category of data is no longer available. Therefore, for the sake of consistency with
earlier studies, we have used 5.7% of total tort liability, which represents a slight increase in
the percentage of 1960 tort awards paid by railroads and motor carriers. See CONARD-MORGAN, supra main text note 46, at 48 tbl. 1-2.
7 For a description of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at
931-33.
' SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN.,

U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH AND

HUMAN

SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURrIY BULLE-

313 tbl. 9.B1 (1992).
9
1d. at 119 tbl. 3.A3. The figure given represents the benefits paid under short-term disability insurance, which employers in California, Hawaii, NewJersey, New York, Puerto Rico,
and Rhode Island are required by state law to provide to their employees. C. ARTHUR
TIN, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT

WILLIAM ET AL., ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SECURITY- SOCIAL INSURANCE AND OTHER APPROACH-

255 (5th ed. 1982). Short-term disability insurance protects employees unable to work
because of nonoccupational injuries and illness. See id. at 255-67 (explaining these insurance plans in further detail).
0
' SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., supra note 8, at 119 tbl. 3.A3. The figure given represents benefits
provided under insurance which railroads are required by federal law to provide their
employees to protect them in the case of short-term disability caused by nonoccupational
injury or illness. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 9, at 434-35 (explaining this coverage in
more detail).
" For a description of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at
934-36.
" See AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, 1991 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 19, 57-58.
Total death benefits from private insurance companies, veterans' life insurance, and fraternal life insurance were $23,967 million, of which $9,346 million came from group insurance policies and $14,621 million came from other plans. In calculating the figure
presented in this Appendix, we assumed, for the sake of consistency with earlier articles,
that the ratio of reserves released by death-to-total death benefits was 20.3% (for a fuller
explanation of this term, see supra Appendix A note 12). So: $14,621 million - ($14,621 x
79.7%) = $11,653 million.
11HEALTH INSURANCE ASs'N OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 29 tbl.
2.9 (1991).
ES

14

rd.

COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, supra note 12, at 19. Group policies provide almost entirely for loss-shifting, with very low transaction costs. See CONARD-MORGAN, supra
main text note 46, at 50 n.58. Accordingly, no adjustment for transaction costs is provided.
" HEALTH INSURANCE ASS'N OF AMERICA, supra note 13, at 28 tbl. 2.7 (1991).
,7See id. at 27-29 tbls. 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9. This figure was calculated by reducing the total
benefit payments by all insurers for medical expenses ($171,100 million, id. at 27 tbl. 2.6)
by the amount of medical expenses that were paid for individual policies ($6,600 million,
id. at 29 tbl. 2.9), loss of income payments ($4,600 million, id. at 28 tbl. 2.7), and duplicative administrative costs ($900 million, id. at 28 tbl. 2.8). So: $171,100 million - $6,600
million - ($4,600 million - $900 million) = $160,800 million.
" For a description of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at
936-38.
9
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1992 STATISTICAL ABsTRA-Cr OF THE
UNITED STATES 368 tbl. 589. Of the total figure, $9,472 million was provided in sick leave
for government employees and $7,557 million was provided in sick leave for workers in
private employment. Id.
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2' For a description of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at
938-46.

2I SOCIAL SEc. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLE-

132 tbl. 4.A5, 133 tbl. 4.A6 (1991).
Old Age, Survivors', and Disability Insurance.

TIN, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT

OASDI means

2 SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLE-

TIN, ANNUAL SATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 106 tbl.
3 Id.

3.C1 (1990).

24 Id.

26 Id.

Id. at
Id. at
2 Id. at
2Id.
at
2

266 tbl. 7.B2.

265 tbl. 7.B1.
266 tbl. 7.B2.
265 tbl. 7.B1.

-' For a description of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at

946-48.

51

BUREAU OF THE

CENSUS,

supra note 19, at 103 tbl. 150.

2

. This category of data is no longer available. For the sake of consistency with earlier

articles, the figure given is 3.69% of the total figure for public assistance, which is the same
proportion used in earlier studies. See O'Connell & Guinivan, supra main text note 59, at
768 n.27; O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at 924 tbl. E.
& SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., supra note 21, at 286 tbl. 9.A4. SSI means Supplemental Security
Income. The figure given includes federal and state SSI payments for general disability
($10,177 million) and for blindness ($302 million), but does not include SSI old age payments. So: $10,177 million + $302 million = $10,479 million.
' Office of Research and Demonstrations, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, National Health Expenditures 1988 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Summer 1990, at 38 tbl. 22.
" For a description of this category, see O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at

948-49.
'

7

SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., supra note 22, at 106 tbl. 3.C1.
id.

131 tbl. 22. This figure excludes expenditures for service-connected diseases and injuries. It was computed by reducing the cost of VA-provided medical care ($10,230 million, id. at 7) by the percentage of
veterans who received medical and surgical treatments that were service related (24.5%, see
id. at 131 tbl. 22 (262,407 of 1,071,147 total patients)). See also CONARD-MORGAN, supra
main text note 46, at 51-52 n.62 (similarly excluded service-connected expenditures with
this method of calculation).
" See Office of Research and Demonstrations, supra note 34, at 38 tbl. 22. This figure
includes $11.6 billion reported for expenditures by "state and local hospitals" (not offset by
38 See DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 7,

other revenues) and $6.4 billion reported for "other public programs for personal health
care," including "program spending for maternal and child health; vocational rehabilitation medical payments; temporary disability insurance medical payments; Public Health
Service and other Federal hospitals; Indian health services; alcoholism, drug abuse, and
mental health; and school health." Id..
'0For a description of this category, see supra main text note 55.
41 Office of Research and Demonstrations, supra note 34, at 30 tbl. 15.

1334

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1303

APPENDIX C
BENEFITS PAID FOR INJURY AND ILLNESS BY THE PRINCIPAL
LOSS-SHIFTING SYSTEMS, 1984
(DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)

Survivors
Tort Liability
Auto Personal Injury
Insured
Uninsured
Other Personal Injury Insurance
Claims
Medical Malpractice
Other
Railroad & Motor Carriers
Total Tort Liability
Workers' Compensation
Other: (State)
(Railroad)
Total Workers' Compensation
Private Loss Insurance
Individual Policies
Group Policies
Total Private Loss Insurance
Sick Leave
Social Insurance
OASDI
Railroad Retirement
Fed. Civil Service
Other Federal
State and Local
Medicare A
Medicare B
Total Social Insurance
Public Assistance
Medicaid
General Assistance
SSI
Other
Total Public Assistance
Veterans
Public Health
Private Health
TOTAL ALL SYSTEMS

Disability

S

Medical

_-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1,590
-

8,803
7,655

11,569
1,800
42

1,253
3,907

-

12,858

33,917
1,679
2,963
536
903

17,779
681
4,080
1,446
1,987
4,189
2,490

3,230

Total

17,2391
2072

2,572
7,827
1,683'
29,528
19,529
1,800
42
21,371

6,370
-

4,841
98,879
-

33,418
16,034

--7,392
-

33,891
1,658

10,578
-

6,3757
13,000
11,200

-

2,000

% of
All
Benefits

7.4%

5.3%

14,897
110,441
125,338
12,8584

31.3%
3.2%

51,696
2,360
7,043
1,982
2,890
37,607
18,5246
122,102

30.5%

33,891
1,658
7,392
2,000
44,941
20,183
13,000
11,200
$400,521

11.2%
5.0%
3.2%
2.8%
100.0%

Sources: This table is taken from O'Connell & Guinivan, supra main text note 59, except
for corrected figures as noted in the following footnotes for any changes made necessary
by such corrected figures. Complete source information can be found in the original.
'This figure is corrected from $26,521 million, as originally reported in O'Connell &
Guinivan, supra main text note 59, at 766. In that earlier study, the authors erroneously
included benefits paid for property damage. The figure reported is based upon an assumption that 35% of automobile liability payments are paid for property damage (the
percentage applicable in 1985, the earliest year for which such information was readily
available), which therefore should not be included in the listing for benefits paid for injury
and illness. See NATIONAL
INSURANCE DATABASE

million.

ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS,

1993

AUTOMOBILE

26 tbl. 8, 37 tbl. 9. So: $26,521 million x (100% - 35%) = $17,239
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2

This figure is corrected from $318 million, as originally reported in O'Connell &
Guinivan, supramain text note 59, at 766. This figure was computed by assuming that the
personal injury payments made by motorists themselves, apart from liability coverage or
from uninsured motorist coverage, amounted to 1.2% of the insured personal injury payments, see supra note 1 and accompanying text. The 1.2% figure was used in CouNARMORGAN, supra main text note 46, at 50 n.54. So: $17,239 million x 1.2% = $207 million.
'This figure is corrected from $2,251 million, as originally reported in O'Connell &
Guinivan, supra main text note 59, at 766. The correction was necessitated by changes to
the Automobile Personal Injury payment category, as Railroad & Motor Carriers is calculated as 5.7% of Tort Liability generally. See id. at 767 n.6. So: 5.7% x $29,528 million =
$1,683 million.
4
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1992 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNrrED STATES 368 tbl. 589. This figure represents the sum of sick leave for government

employees ($7,218) and sick leave for workers in private employment ($5,640), id.; it is
corrected from $11,389 million, as originally reported in O'Connell & Guinivan, supra
main text note 59, at 768 n.16. That earlier study used data from 1983, because the data
for 1984 was unavailable; we have now included the actual 1984 data. Id.
I See SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITy
BULLETIN, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 283 tbl. 7.B1, 284 tbl. 7.B2 (1988). This figure
was computed as follows: $4,189 million (Disability) + $33,418 million (Medical) = $37,607
million (Total Medicare A). This is a correction from $33,050 million, as originally reported in O'Connell & Guinian, supra main text note 59, at 768 n.23. That earlier study used
the wrong data source.
6
See SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., supra note 5, at 283 tbl. 7.B1, 284 tbl. 7.B2. This figure was computed as follows: $2,490 million (Disability) + $16,034 million (Medical) = $18,524 million
(Medicare B). This is a correction from $17,854 million, as originally reported in
O'Connell & Guinivan, supra main text note 59, at 768 n.24. That earlier study used the
wrong data source.
7
See DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 9, 202 tbl. 28 (1984). This figure
excludes expenditures for service-connected diseases and injuries. It was computed by reducing the cost of VA-provided medical care, $8,301 million, id at 9, by the percentage of
veterans who received medical and surgical treatments that were service related, 23.2%. See
id. at 202 tbl. 28 (231,670 of 996,973 total patients). CONARD-MoRCAN, supra main text
note 46, at 51 n.62, similarly excluded service-connected expenditures with this method of
calculation. This figure is corrected from $6,973 million, as originally reported in
O'Connell & Guinivan, supra main text note 59, at 766 n.33. The authors of that earlier
study mistakenly reduced the cost of VA-provided medical care by the percentage of patients receiving care for a service-connected disability on the census day (September 30,
1984), 16.0%, which was not an adequate representation of the average makeup of the
hospitals' patients. Id. See also DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra, at 70.
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APPENDIX D
BENEFITS PAID FOR INJURY AND ILLNESS BY THE PRINCIPAL
LOSS-SHIFTING SYSTEMS,

1982

(DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)

Survivors
Tort Liability
Auto Personal Injury
Insured
Uninsured
Other Personal Injury Insurance
Claims
Medical Malpractice
Other
Railroad & Motor Carriers
Total Tort Liability
Workers' Compensation
Other: (State)
(Railroad)
Total Workers' Compensation
Private Loss Insurance
Individual Policies
Group Policies
Total Private Loss Insurance
Sick Leave
Social Insurance
OASDI
Railroad Retirement
Fed. Civil Service
Other Federal
State and Local
Medicare A
Medicare B
Total Social Insurance
Public Assistance
Medicaid
General
SSI
Other
Total Public Assistance
Veterans
Public Health
Private Health
TOTAL ALL SYSTEMS

Disability

S

Medical

_-

Total

-

-

-

14,175'
170-

-

-

-

1,994
5,467

-

-

1,500
-

7,726
6,953
-

-

9,825
1,568
56

1,385
4,144
10,607

33,612
1,644
2,507
424
739
-

17,338
668
3,664
1,428
1,035
3,878
2,294

4,820
-

3,572
79,082
29,214
12,311

29,399
1,442
--

6,126
2,100

3,113

10,203

5,851
13,200
10,900

% of
All
Benefits

1,3183

23,124
16,145
1,568
56
17,769

6.7%

5.1%

12,683
90,179
102,862
10,607

29.6%
3.1%

50,950
2,312
6,171
1,852
1,774
33,0924
14,6055
110,756

31.9%

29,399
1,442
6,126
2,100
39,067
19,167
13,200
10,900
$347,452

11.2%
5.5%
3.8%
3.1%
100.0%

Sources: This table was originally presented in O'Connell & Baker, supra main text note
47. It was reprinted in O'Connell & Guinivan, supra main text 59, where some corrections
were made. As detailed in the following footnotes, some additional corrections were necessary. Complete source information is found in the original.
'This figure is corrected from $21,807 million, as given in O'Connell & Barker, supra main
text note 47, at 924. In that earlier study, the authors erroneously included benefits paid
for property damage. The figure reported is based upon an assumption that 35% of automobile liability payments are paid for property damage (the percentage applicable in 1985,
the earliest year for which such information was readily available), which are not included

as benefits paid for injury and illness. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMIS1993 AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE DATABASE 26 tbl. 8, 37 tbl. 9. So: $21,807 million x

SIONERS,

(100% - 35%) = $14,175 million.
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2 This figure is corrected from $261 million, as originally reported in O'Connell & Barker,

supra main text note 47, at 924. It was computed by assuming that the personal injury
payments made by motorists themselves, apart from liability coverage or from uninsured
motorist coverage, amounted to a sum equal to 1.2% of the insured personal injury payments. This figure was used in CONARD-MoRGAN, supra main text note 46, at 50 n.54. So:
$14,175 million x 1.2% = $170 million.
'This figure is corrected from $1,783 million, as originally reported in O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at 924. The correction was necessitated by changes to the
Automobile Personal Injury payment category, as Railroad & Motor Carriers was calculated
as a percentage (5.7%) of Tort Liability generally. See id. at 925 n.6.
4
See SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T oF H.LTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, SoCIAL SECuRnTY
BULLETIN, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEmENT 232 tbl. 145, 233 tbl. 146 (1986). This figure
was computed as follows: $3,878 million (Disability) + $29,214 million (Medical) = $33,092
million (Total Medicare A). This is a correction from $30,875 million, as originally reported in O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at 924. The authors of that earlier
study used the wrong data source.
' See SociAL SEC. ADMIN., supra note 4, at 232 tbl. 145, 233 tbl. 146. This figure was computed as follows: $2,294 million (Disability) + $12,311 million (Medical) = $14,605 million
(Medicare B). This is a correction from $15,071 million, as originally reported in
O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, at 924. The authors of that earlier study
used the wrong data source.
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APPENDIX E
BENEFITS PAID FOR INJURY AND ILLNESS BY THE PRINCIPAL
LOSS-SHIFTING SYSTEMS,

1960

(DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)
Tort Liability
Auto Personal Injury
Insured Payments
Uninsured Payments
Other Personal Injury Insurance
Payments
Medical Malpractice
Other
Railroad & Motor Carriers
Total Tort Liability
Workers' Compensation
Other: (State)
(Railroad)
Total Workers' Compensation
Private Loss Insurance
Individual Policies
Group Policies
Total Private Loss Insurance
Sick Leave
Social Insurance
OASDI
Railroad Retirement
Fed. Civil Service
Other Federal
State/Local
Medicare A
Medicare B
Total Social Insurance
Public Assistance
Medicaid
General
SSI
Other
Total Public Assistance
Veterans
Public Health
Private Health
TOTAL ALL SYSTEMS

Survivors

Disability

Medical

*

*

*

*

*

*

Total

% of All Benefits

1,494
18

0
269
103
1,884

7.9%

105

754

435

105

754

435

1,294

5.4%

1,761
1,115

386
619

446
4,403

-

1,209

-

2,593
6,137
8,730
1,209

36.5%
5.1%

2,954'

1,379

-

4,333

18.1%

1,496
1,760
2,251
965
$23,922

6.3%
7.4%
9.4%
4.0%
100.0%

876
882
-

530
521
2,251
965

Sources: This table is composed of figures originally reported in CONARD-MORGAN, supra
main text note 46, at 48 tbl. 1-2. This table was originally presented in O'Connell & Barker, supra main text note 47, and was reprinted in O'Connell & Guinivan, supra main text
59. The voluminous source references used in the Conard-Morgan study are not reproduced here, but may be consulted in the original. Necessary corrections are noted below.
' This figure was incorrectly reported as $1,954 million, in O'Connell & Barker, supra main
text note 47, at 926, and correctly reprinted in O'Connell & Guinivan, supra main text note
59, at 771. Revisiting CONARD-MORGAN, supra main text note 46, at 48 tbl. 1-2, revealed the
necessary correction.

